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Have the Politics of Rate Regulation Produced 
a Better No-Fault Regime for Ontario ? 
Bruce FELDTHUSEN 
Ontario has changed its no-fault legislation substantially three times 
in the past decade. These changes have reflected the interest group lob-
bying of the insurance industry and the practising bar. However, the main 
and explicit motivation, especially for the latest revision, has been the 
government's desire to regulate rates. With the Automobile Insurance Rate 
Stability Act the government appears to have struck a very successful 
compromise. The lawyers have been allowed an increased, albeit limited, 
right to sue in tort. The insurers have achieved more certainty, with stricter 
time and monetary limits on benefits for non-catastrophic injury. Rates 
have been reduced in part through lower benefit levels, but primarily by 
throwing the cost of automobile accidents on to other collateral sources. 
There is, therefore, some subsidization of driving inherent in the legislation. 
There are also compensation gaps, especially in long term health care, that 
affect mainly the most vulnerable members of society. Both these short-
comings could and should be easily corrected. So far, it would appear that 
the politics of rate regulation have generated an improved no-fault auto-
mobile accident compensation scheme for Ontario. 
Au cours des dix dernières années, l'Ontario a modifié trois fois et de 
façon substantielle son régime d'assurance automobile sans égard à la 
responsabilité. Ces réformes sont le reflet des pressions exercées par les 
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assureuss et les avocats. Cependan,, le principal motif avancé était, surtout 
pour la dernière révision, la volonté du gouvernement de réglementer le 
taux des primes d'assurance. Un heureux compromss semble avoir été 
trouvé avec la Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act Les avocass ont vu 
les possibilités de poursuites accrues, quoique de façon limitée. Les assu-
reurs ont obtenu plus de certitude dans leurs prévision,, en raison de délais 
restreints et du plafonnement des indemnités dans le cas de blessures moins 
importantes. Les primes d'assurance ont été en partie réduites à cause 
d'une diminuiion des indemnités, mais surtout par un transfett des coûts 
générés par les accidenss d'automobile vers d'autres sources d'indemnisa-
tion. La loi entraîne ainsi une forme de subveniion de la condutte automo-
bile. Il y a également des lacunes au niveau de l'indemnisation, surtout en 
ce qui concerne l'assistance médicale à long terme, qui touche principale-
ment les membres les plus vulnérables de la société. Ces insuffisances 
pourraient et devraient être facllement corrigées. Jusqu'à maintenant, le 
contrôle exercé sur les primes a semblé donner à l'Ontario un meilleur 
régime d'assurance automobile sans égard à la responsabilité. 
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As you will have learned from my colleague, Craig Brown, Ontario has 
enjoyed (if enjoyed is the word) three different no-fault automobile insu-
rance schemes during this decade1. Nor is it entirely à coincidence that 
Ontario has also enjoyed three different political parties in power during the 
1. C. BROWN, «No-fault Automobile Insurance in Ontario: A Long and Complicated 
Story », (1998) Cahiers de Droit 63-86 (special issue). 
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nineties. Each was the architect of a new regime. The first was a threshold 
scheme, the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan, which came into effect on 
June 21, 19902. The second was a much more generous plan known as Bill 
164 that came into effect on January 1,19943. The third and present scheme, 
generally referred to as Bill 59, came into effect on November 1, 1996. Its 
proper name, in more ways than one, is the Automobile Insurance Rate 
Stability Act*. 
The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at the core provisions 
of the newest scheme as it deals with economic loss. I will not deal with the 
minutiae, beyond noting that there is enough of it to make an Income Tax 
Act drafter proud. I will concentrate primarily on the provisions governing 
compensation for lost income and earning capacity, and those governing 
recovery for health or future care costs. 
In brief, the new Act curtails the economic no-fault benefits conside-
rably from what they were under Bill 164, and even from what they were 
under the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan. Except in the case of the 
catastrophically injured, the new Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule5 
provides only basic compensation for a limited time. Most automobile 
accident compensation will be obtained from other public and private 
insurers, especially from Ontario Health Insurance Protection (OHIP)6 and 
under employment benefit plans. Insurers are required to provide optional 
extra cover for those who want it and do not have it in their employment or 
otherwise. Duplicated cover, and the wasteful effects of the collateral 
source rule, are discouraged. The right to sue in tort for economic loss is 
preserved for excess loss only. 
Obviously, automobile insurance is, and has been for some time, a 
major political issue in Ontario. As one would expect, the two most promi-
nent interest groups whose demands have shaped the outcomes are the 
practising bar and the insurance industry. The Act testifies to the success of 
both lobbies. The insurers have achieved strictly defined monetary and 
temporal limits to replace the open-ended risks they dread to underwrite. 
The lawyers have achieved an expanded right to sue for excess economic 
loss. More fundamentally, whereas Bill 164 might have been viewed as the 
2. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8, as amended by Ontario Motorist Protection Plan, 
S.O. 1990, c. 2. 
3. Ibid. ; S.O. 1993, c. 10. 
4. Ibid. ; Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act, S.O. 1996, c. 21 [hereinafter Insurance 
Act]. 
5. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule—Accidents on or afterNovember 1', 1996,0. Reg. 
403/96, as amended by O. Reg. 462/96 [hereinafter Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule]. 
6. See infra, note 60 and accompanying text. 
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first step towards a pure no-fault scheme, the new legislation manifests an 
entirely different philosophy. Effectively, the new scheme adopts what 
Professor Luntz refers to as the welfare model of accident compensation7. 
It remains politically useful, and economically of no great moment, to retain 
tort for excess loss. 
It bears repeating that each of the last three provincial governments has 
also been a major player with its own independent agenda8. I am not 
referring to the governments' public interest agenda in devising a fair and 
efficient compensation system. Rather I am referring to the governments' 
concern with automobile insurance rate regulation ; specifically, the desire 
to accommodate the barristers and the insurers while at the same time 
keeping mandatory auto insurance premiums low enough to avoid disaster 
at the polls. Automobile insurance in Ontario is private, not public. Never-
theless, at least since 1987, political parties have seen rate control as a 
«hot» political issue9. Most citizens drive, and most are aware of any 
changes in their auto insurance premiums. Premiums are of more immediate 
concern to voters than the remote prospect of future injury. Voters are 
aware that the government effectively controls the rates. Governments 
realize they might well succeed at the polls by keeping rates down, and could 
lose support should they preside over a period of increase. 
It follows that it may be both unfair and unproductive to criticize the 
Ontario no-fault scheme primarily on compensation grounds. It is no coin-
cidence that the Act is titled the Automoblle Insurance Rate Stability Act. 
If the scheme and the rates stay stable for the next few years, something that 
has not happened in some time, the legislation will be judged a great success. 
It will have achieved the goals set by the government, and satisfied the 
price-conscious (and possibly short-sighted) desires of the electorate. This 
is precisely what I think will occur. If so, then complaints by those automo-
bile accident victims whose compensation needs are being poorly served by 
the no-fault scheme are going to prove futile, unless their interests happen 
7. I have had the advantage of reading Professor Luntz's excellent paper prepared for this 
conference, « Compensation for Loss of an Economic Nature : An Australian Perspec-
tive ». The similarities of our opinions on most issues has given me great comfort. 
8. Rate regulation through benefit adjustment is an old story. See B. FELDTHUSEN, « Prices 
and Politics : Automobile Insurance Rate Regulation in Ontario», (1989) 1 Can Ins. L. 
Rev. 283. The present government admitted outright in interviews prior to passing the 
legislation that the government was « mainly interested in addressing the instability of 
auto insurance rate structures and the hefty increases with which consumers were faced. 
See J. FURLONG, «Ontario considers revisions to no-fault insurance», (1995) 15:20 
Lawyers Weekly 16. 
9. B. FELDTHUSEN, loc. cit., note 8, at 298. 
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to coincide with those of the bar or the insurers. Those victims will have to 
look elsewhere in the public or private realm for relief. 
There is no question that no-fault economic loss benefits have been 
substantially reduced in the new Act from what they were under Bill 164, 
and even from what they were under the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan. 
That in itself does not necessarily mean the new scheme is worse than its 
predecessors. What it does mean is that the level of benefits available from 
the « quasi-public » no-fault automobile scheme is diverging sharply from 
what would be obtained in a successful tort suit on behalf of a seriously 
injured plaintiff. What it also means is that « quasi-public » no-fault automo-
bile benefits are coming back into line with the level of benefits available 
from other public schemes such as worker's compensation10. Although this 
may not have been the motivation of the lawyers, insurers or government, 
one impact of the new rate stabilization scheme may be to effect an impor-
tant step on the path towards integration of the compensation of auto 
accident victims with that of other victims of accidents and illness11. 
1. Income Replacement and Earning Capacity 
1.1 The Benefits 
Income replacement benefits are dealt with under the Statutory Acci-
dent Benefits Schedule11. Section 4 deals with claimants who were 
employed or about to be employed at the time of the accident, or employed 
for at least half the year prior to the accident13. The basic test for compen-
sation during the two years after the accident is a « substantial inability to 
perform the essential tasks of the employment ». 
In common with most no-fault plans elsewhere, relatively minor claims 
are excluded from the scheme. In Ontario, as it is the case in Quebec, this is 
accomplished by providing that no benefits are available for the first seven 
days after the accident14. 
For most claimants, the income replacement benefits will be tempo-
rary. After the two year period, the victim is not entitled to any loss of 
10. For example, under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Schedule 
A, which came into force on January 1,1998, the basic income replacement rule provides 
for 85 % of weekly average net income. 
11. This is discussed as a desirable goal by Professor Luntz, supra, note 7. 
12. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 4-11. 
13. The non-eamer benefit is defined in s. 12 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, 
and is available to someone who suffers a « complete inability to carry on a normal life ». 
It is usually in the amount of $185/week, with a 26-week waiting period. 
14. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 5 (2) (a). 
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income or earning capacity benefits15. There is an exception if there exists 
a « complete inability to engage in any employment for which he or she is 
reasonably suited by education, training, or experience», in which case the 
benefits continue until age 65 and are then reduced16. This is one of several 
thresholds in the legislation that creates a compensation gap17. In this case, 
persons whose earning capacity is seriously and permanently reduced, but 
less than to the extent of complete inability, fall into the gap. Those who are 
fortunate enough to have been injured by a solvent defendant may turn to 
tort. The others will be treated like any other similarly situated person in 
Ontario with a like disability18. 
The basic rule for quantifying income replacement is that the plan will 
pay 80 % of the victim's pre-accident after tax earnings to a maximum of 
$40019. This is a decrease from 90 % of net weekly income to a maximum of 
$ 1,000 under Bill 164, and 80 % of gross earnings under the Ontario Motorist 
Protection Plan20. Eighty per cent of earnings received free of tax as com-
pensation for personal injury was putting more money in the hands of most 
accident victims than they were receiving from their pre-accident earnings 
net of tax. Professor Luntz refers to this as the « moral hazard » problem21. 
It violates the spirit if not the letter of the indemnity principle. It was just 
plain wasteful. The 80% net rule is a sensible quantum, similar to that 
employed in other plans. 
The $400 limit should be assessed in conjunction with other sources. 
The plan is the secondary source of cover, paying only after amounts 
received or available from other public or private income replacement 
15. Id., s. 5 (2) (b). 
16. Under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 6 (1) (a) and (b), the minimum 
payment after 104 weeks is $185/week. The amending formula used when the beneficiary 
reaches age 65 is found in s. 9. 
17. Compare Luntz's discussion of the Victoria plan, supra, note 7, at s. 2.4.2. In contrast, 
Victoria does extend health care benefits to those below the threshold, whereas Ontario 
does not. See the prose beginning at note 44, infra. 
18. The distributional consequences of this are discussed infra, section 3. 
19. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 6 ( 1) (a) and 7(1). Under r. 6 ( 1 ( (b) the minimum 
of $185 is payable after the first two years. Under s. 5, benefits run for more than two 
years only if there exists a « complete inability to engage in any employment for which 
he or she is reasonably suited by education, training, or experience ». The $400 limit 
does not necessarily apply if the insured had elected to purchase optional cover ; avai-
lable under s. 27. 
20. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule—Accidents on or after January J, 1994, ,s .1(1), 
(2) and (9), Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule—Accidents before January 1, 1994, 
s. 12 (4) and (5). 
21. Infra, note 60, at 2.4.4. 
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schemes22. Thus, a victim would turn first to any other sources of compen-
sation, and look to the no-fault scheme only for excess loss, if any23. Drivers 
without good sources of other collateral benefits who wish to insure their 
earnings for more than $400/week must purchase the optional income re-
placement cover available under the scheme24. These are the claimants most 
affected by the lowering of the limit from $1,000 to $400. Claimants with 
generous employment benefits would have replaced most of their income 
long before requiring the full $1,000 from the former no-fault scheme25. 
The part of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule dealing with 
these benefits is titled : Income replacement benefit. This suggests that 
these provisions are designed to restore a victim's pre-accident earnings or 
capacity. This is an indemnity model, not an entitlement model. This is what 
Professor Luntz has called the restitution model. The scheme is also regres-
sive, and mirrors the tort system in this respect. Industry representatives are 
unaware of any insurers who adjust their rates to reflect the earnings of their 
insureds. Thus, the rates paid by less wealthy drivers reflect the risk they 
will have to restore high earners to their pre-accident standard of living, 
while receiving much lower benefits themselves. 
In reality, all of this is qualified considerably by the $400 cap. The cap 
adds a welfare or social security impact to the scheme. It is unclear whether 
this occurred by accident or by design. The impact may be a side effect of 
rate reduction policies. Regardless, the scheme will provide at most com-
pensation for the loss of roughly an average Ontario earner's income26. 
Higher than average income earners will have to protect themselves through 
other plans, including employment plans or optional cover. This strikes me 
as just and appropriate. It is one thing for the state to guarantee all its 
citizens basic income maintenance ; it is quite another to mandate complete 
no-fault lifestyle insurance. This is one advantage of a system that no longer 
22. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 7 and 60 (1). 
23. There are some exceptions that may prove significant. One is that provided a claimant 
has applied for a collateral benefit and has not yet received it, the amount of that 
(disputed ?) benefit will not be deducted from the no-fault award. Second, even if sick 
leave payments are available, they are not deducted unless they are actually being 
received. Third, payments under the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 are not 
deducted. See Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 7 (1) I.ii and (2) (b). Also, a 
disability payment payable under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 (here-
inafter CPP) is presumably not to be deducted based on the interpretation of identical 
wording in an earlier act. See Culargi v. White, [1998] O.J. No. 1628 (C.A.). 
24. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 27. 
25. The distributional consequences are discussed infra, section 3. 
26. The Ontario ministry of Finance reported on February 9, 1998 that Ontario per-
sonal per capita income was $23,896 per year. This information can be located at 
http://www.gov.on.ca/fin/english/oecoeng.htm (consulted at the beginning of May 1998). 
480 Les Cahiers de Droit (1998) 39 C. de D. 473 
pretends to be an alternative to tort law. It can better divorce itself from 
aspects of tort law that do not correspond to social accident compensation 
goals. Those who can prove fault on the part of a solvent defendant may still 
bring an action to recover the loss of excess earnings in tort. 
1.2 The Tort Rights 
As a result of Bill 59, there is no per se ban on tort actions for economic 
loss, nor any provision written in the language of the traditional Ontario 
thresholds27. The old verbal threshold now applies only for non-economic 
loss28. This would seem to be a major improvement in the fortunes of the 
personal injury plaintiffs' bar over what they were under the previous 
regimes. The plaintiffs bar seems to be very pleased29. Nevertheless, des-
pite the absence of any outright bar, there are some provisions that are 
referred to by members of the bar as « hidden thresholds ». A more careful 
look suggests that although there is considerably more scope for tort actions 
than under Bill 164, the new regime may effectively render tort unavailable 
or unattractive for most victims unless they have been very seriously 
injured30. This is as it should be. 
Section 267.5 ( 1) of the Act precludes any liability for damages suffered 
in the first seven days after the accident31. It also caps claims for pre-trial 
income and earning capacity losses at 80 % of net loss. That cap must be 
read in conjunction with s. 267.8 (1) which states that the damages to which 
the victim would otherwise be entitled must be reduced by all collateral 
payments for lost income or earning capacity received or available before 
trial, including payments for statutory accident benefits32, public and pri-
27. All three of the Ontario plans have been threshold plans, employing different combina-
tions of adjectives such as « serious », « permanent » and « physical ». Needless to say, 
the thresholds in the earlier legislation have produced the predictable volume of litigation 
quibbling over the meaning of these words. The so-called trilogy of leading decisions 
includes : Meyer v. Bright, (1993) 15 O.R. (3d) 130 (C.A.) ; Grossi v. Bates, (1995) 21 O.R. 
(3d) 564 ; and Chilman v. Dimitrijevic, (1996) 28 O.R. (3d) 536. See generally, J. VIGMOND, 
« Threshold Update : The Chronically Painful Saga Continues », (1998) Practical Strate-
gies For Advocates VII— « Four Tort and Accident Schemes Ago » (The Advocates 
Society). 
28. Insurance Act, s. 267.5 (5). 
29. See e.g., R. OATLEY, « Economic Loss Is Back ! » (unpublished paper prepared for the 
Canadian Bar Association Ontario, September 27,1996) describing the Bill as a « dream ». 
30. See for example D. MARSHALL, «No Fault No Money », (1997)21:3 Can. Law. 17 at 19, 
quoting R. BOGOROCH, «The glory days of personal injury are over». Other lawyers 
who do not wish to be quoted have indicated that tort activity under the new scheme is 
far less than they had anticipated. 
31. Insurance Act, s. 267.5 (1). 
32. Id., s. 258.3 (1) (a) makes application for the benefits a condition precedent to commen-
cing an action. 
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vate income continuation benefits and benefits from sick leave arising from 
employment33. The deductions are only to be made from heads of damage 
in respect of whose purposes match the purpose of those heads — income 
replacement collateral benefits reduce lost income awards, and so on34. 
These deductions leave the possibility for only relatively small claims in 
respect of pre-trial income loss. More important, it means that the less 
seriously injured who have substantially recovered and returned to work 
during the normal waiting period for trial will not find the tort suit worth-
while. This is a desirable improvement for the tort system35. 
The greatest potential for actions in tort lies in the area of damage to 
future earning capacity. There is no restriction on the right to sue for this. 
Nor, as there is with pre-trial earnings, is there any statutory cap. The 
difference between a right to 80 % pre-trial earnings net of tax available 
before trial, and 100 % of gross earnings available after trial, may encourage 
lawyers to get their claims to trial sooner. 
The main disincentive to claiming earnings loss derives from the treat-
ment of future collateral benefits, governed by s. 267.8 (9) of the Act. This 
section requires a plaintiff who has recovered damages for lost income or 
earning capacity to hold in trust all related collateral benefit payments 
received, including statutory accident benefits, and public and private bene-
fits including sick leave. Section 267.8 (10) requires the plaintiff to repay 
these benefits on a pro rata basis to the defendants who have provided 
them. The purpose of this arrangement is to prevent double recovery by the 
victim. It removes any incentive to sue for losses already covered by 
collateral sources. Section 267.8 (17) provides that the collateral sources do 
not have any rights of subrogation in respect to any benefits paid. Thus, they 
cannot compel the victim to initiate a law suit for their benefit. 
The somewhat cumbersome trust arrangement was designed to deal 
with a problem that had manifested itself in the previous regimes. The courts 
were suggesting that it may have been necessary to deduct from damages to 
33. Id., s. 267.8 (1). The rule regarding Canada Pension Plan benefits from the Culargi case, 
(supra, note 23) would apply here also. In addition, under s. 267.8 (2), any collateral 
benefits paid within the first seven days of the incident shall not be used to reduce the 
damage claim. Also, under s. 267.8 (15), payments already received or which will become 
available under the Workers Compensation Act, R.S.0.1990, c.W.ll, which has recently 
been amended by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Schedule 
A, on January 1, 1998, will not be used to reduce damages awarded under s. 267.8 (1). 
34. Bannon v. McNeely, [1998] O.J. No. 1673 (C.A.). 
35. Recall that the Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation of Victims of 
Automobile Accidents, 1965 discovered the opposite—minor claims in tort fared better 
than serious ones. See A. LINDEN, « Peaceful Co-existence and Automobile Accident 
Compensation», (1966) 9 Can. B. J. 5 at 7. 
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which the plaintiff was otherwise entitled the present value of amounts that 
the plaintiff was predicted to recover in the future from collateral sources36. 
The problem with this, at least from the perspective of the plaintiffs' bar, 
was that the plaintiff might not, in fact, ever receive those collateral benefits 
in those predicted amounts. Equally, one could argue that the plaintiff might 
never experience the predicted future losses on which the basic tort damage 
award was premised. The new legislation opts instead for what amounts to 
a periodic review and accounting of collateral payments, without a periodic 
review of the premises on which the tort damages were paid. Naturally, few 
plaintiffs will want to be bothered with operating such a trust plan. Section 
267.8 (12) allows a judge to order, on conditions, that the plaintiff assign to 
the defendants any right to collateral payments. 
2. Health Care 
2.1 The Benefits 
The basic health care entitlements are defined in Part V of the Statutory 
Accidents Benefiss Schedule. The plan is required to meet « reasonable and 
necessary expenses » for medical, rehabilitation, and attendant care needs37. 
The sum of the medical and rehabilitation benefits may not exceed $100,000, 
and the amount of the attendant care benefit shall not exceed $72,00038. The 
medical and rehabilitation benefits are not ordinarily payable for longer 
than ten years, nor the care benefit for more than two years, after the 
accident39. Some relief from these time restrictions may be obtained from 
judicial decisions under the earlier schemes indicating that an expense that 
is known within the period to be certain to be incurred in the future is an 
expense incurred within the period for the purposes of obtaining no-fault 
benefits40. 
There are exceptions to the above in the case of « catastrophic impair-
ment », a term which is defined in considerable medical detail in the regula-
36. The leading cases are Coderre v. Lambert, (1993) 14 O.R. (3d) 453 (C.A.) ; Whittle v. 
Ontario (Minister of Transportation and Communications), (1995) 24 O.R. (3d) 394 (Gen. 
Div.) ; Orchover v. Wright, (1996) 28 O.R. (3d) 263 (Gen. Div.) ; Sharp v. Hall, (1997) 44 
C.C.L.I. (2d) 200 (General Division) ; Chrappa v. Ohm, [1998] O.J. No. 1678 (C.A.) ; and 
Bannon v. McNeely, [1998] O.J. No. 1673 (CA.). See also Cox v. Carter, (1976) 13 O.R. 
(2d) 717 (H.C.) ; Stante v. Boudreau, (1980) 29 O.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.). 
37. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 14 (2), 15 (2), 16 (2). 
38. Id., s. 19(1) and (2). 
39. Id., s. 18(1) and (2). 
40. See e.g., Placken v. Canadian Surety Co., (1990) 47 C.C.L.I. 268 (Ontario Dist. Ct.); 
Smith (Committee of) v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co., (1996) 38 C.C.L.I. (2d) 223 
(Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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tions41. The time limits for the medical and rehabilitation benefits do not 
apply in the case of catastrophic impairment. The cap on the sum of medical 
and rehabilitation benefits in catastrophic cases is $1,000,000, compared to 
$100,000 in other cases42. The limit for attendant care is $6,000 per month to 
a total of $1,000,000, not $3,000 per month to a limit of $72,000 as in other 
cases43. In effect, the care benefits that were available to anyone who 
reasonably required them under Bill 164 are now available only to those 
who cross the « catastrophic impairment » threshold. 
Interestingly, hospitals are under financial pressure to discharge pa-
tients as quickly. That means that the amount of medical expenses born by 
the provincial health care plan, OHIP, decreases when the victims are 
discharged into settings not covered by OHIP. Thus, more pressure is 
placed on the no-fault limit than would be the case with longer hospital 
stays. 
The fundamental concern with health care costs is the level of no-fault 
cover. Is it fair and adequate ? One could posit an ideal society in which 
every citizen would be guaranteed a decent standard of living, including 
access to all basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, education, 
security, and so on, and most certainly health care. There would not exist 
compensation schemes, per se. A caring society would provide the best 
health care benefits it could afford. It would provide them equally to 
everyone, including the victims of illness and accident. It would not distin-
guish between and amongst victims of different sorts of accidents. The same 
disability would be treated equally, whether it was incurred by disease, an 
accident in the workplace or the home, or an accident on the highway. From 
that perspective, successful tort plaintiffs would probably do relatively well 
compared to, for example, someone who becomes seriously ill or who is 
injured at home. Similarly, Ontario no-fault claimants probably fare rela-
tively better than many others with similar disabilities. 
For present purposes, only a more conservative critique is possible, 
accepting as given the basic stated premise of the no-fault plan — victims of 
automobile accidents are entitled to « reasonable and necessary » medical 
costs, rehabilitation and attendant care. On that standard, one would have 
to argue that the scheme is not fair and adequate. The simple reason is that 
the scheme imposes limits on claims that are otherwise « reasonable and 
necessary ». If a person reasonably requires more funds for a longer period 
41. Insurance Act, s. 267.5 (3) defined in the Statutory Accident Benefit Schedule, s. 2 (1). 
42. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 19 (1) (b) and (2) (b). 
43. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 16 (5) and 19 (2). 
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than the Schedule allows, the scheme, by definition, does not provide a 
reasonable level of cover. 
There are two classes of plaintiffs who will potentially be deprived of 
reasonable health care benefits. The first consists of persons who may fall 
into another « gap », similar to although differently defined than the earnings 
gap noted above44. Although seriously and permanently injured, these are 
victims whose injuries fail to meet the definition of « catastrophic impair-
ment45 ». The second consists of those whose injuries are catastrophic, but 
whose reasonable needs cannot be met through the benefits available for 
catastrophic impairment. 
Note that there is a huge gap in the benefit levels between the ordinary 
and the catastrophic case, which does not necessarily mirror a huge gap in 
reasonable and necessary health care requirements. The scheme provides 
quite well for the relatively less seriously injured victims. By definition, 
those who fall within the gap are the relatively more seriously injured whose 
injuries are relatively more likely to be permanent. This is exactly the wrong 
distribution of benefits if accident compensation is the goal. 
If the industry predicts that a large number of victims will fall in the 
benefit gap, then Ontario's scheme is defective because it leaves too many 
people without basic necessary health care cover. Alternatively, if only a 
few serious cases are expected to have reasonable needs beyond the statu-
tory limits, why not cover everyone for this remote contingency and spread 
the risk among all drivers ? The answer undoubtedly turns on how much of 
a premium reduction is really attributable to these limits. 
Much the same argument applies to the cover limits for catastrophic 
injury. If many catastrophic victims will not receive reasonable and neces-
sary health care benefits for as long as required, the scheme is defective by 
failing the most vulnerable in society. If only a few are at risk, let us insure 
them. Why throw such a terrible risk by lot to a few victims instead of 
spreading it harmlessly to all drivers ? 
Insurers are required to offer optional health care cover with much 
higher monetary limits and without time limits46. To the extent that there 
exists a market for such cover, it will consist of relatively risk-adverse and 
wealthy drivers. Average drivers do not arrange their affairs on the assump-
tion that they will suffer injuries whose costs exceed the policy limits, even 
44. See supra, note 17 and accompanying text. 
45. Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, s. 2 (1). 
46. Id., s. 27 (1) 3. 
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if they know what those limits are47. More important, the need for reaso-
nable health care, unlike the need for income replacement, does not vary 
with income level. As discussed below, it will be the most vulnerable 
members of society who will suffer the most from this gap in cover. 
2.2 Tort Rights 
Those who have suffered catastrophic impairment may bring an action 
in tort to recover their excess loss48. It is not yet clear whether persons 
whose reasonable and necessary health care needs fall within the gap 
identified above may also sue in tort49. Section 267.5 (3) precludes liability 
for « damages for expenses that have been incurred or will be incurred for 
health care50». I suspect this was intended to operate as a complete bar in 
non-catastrophic cases to claims for expenditures of the nature described in 
the regulations. Put otherwise, in the ordinary case, recovery for health care 
expenditures was intended to be on a pure no-fault basis. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, there will be some, one hopes only a few, persons whose 
injuries are not catastrophic, but whose reasonable expenses exceed the 
limits in the regulations. They will not be able to recover the excess in tort. 
However, the act is not drafted as precisely as one might like. There is room 
for an argument that the plaintiff is precluded only from suing in respect of 
no-fault health care funds that have been or will be actually provided51. In 
that case, the main difference between catastrophic and non-catastrophic 
injuries would be the no-fault claim limits to the duration and amount of the 
benefits. If so, we will experience the curious result that more and larger tort 
claims for health care loss will be brought by seriously injured plaintiffs who 
are not catastrophically injured than by those who are. 
In cases where tort claims for health care losses are permitted, the rules 
governing payments from collateral sources are similar to those discussed 
47. Most of my law students are unaware there exists any no-fault auto coverage in Ontario, 
let alone what the benefit levels are. 
48. Insurance Act, s. 267.5 (4). 
49. It is perhaps not of great moment from an accident compensation perspective whether 
or not there exists a complete bar for health care claims in the ordinary case. The 
administrative savings that accrue from pure no-fault plans are best achieved when there 
is a complete bar to litigation. In Ontario, there survives a limited right to sue for excess 
earning capacity loss and non-pecuniary loss. 
50. « Health care» is defined in the Insurance Act, s. 224 (1) to include all goods and services 
for which payment is provided by the medical, rehabilitation, and attendant care benefits 
provided for in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. Section 14 of the Statutory 
Accident Benefits Schedule provides a detailed definition of the health care expenses 
covered by the legislation. 
51. R. OATLEY, op. cit., note 29. 
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earlier in respect of income and earning capacity. Section is 267.8 (4) 
requires a reduction in damages for all payments received before the trial 
under the scheme or other public and private plans. Future collateral pay-
ments are imposed with a trust exactly as discussed earlier52. 
Claimants may settle their claims by negotiating « cash outs » of their 
statutory accident benefits, albeit with some risks if the case later goes to 
trial53. In the past insurers have demanded discounts ranging from 20 to 
50 %. Apparently, insureds have been willing to accept this, in part in order 
to avoid the need to be «compelled to attend on assessments, medical 
appointments, and participate in rehabilitation programs mandated by the 
accident benefit insurer54 ». With the lower benefits now available, the value 
of the cashouts will be considerably less, and hence less attractive. The 
ability to settle for a lump sum circumvents the advantages to a variable 
periodic payment scheme. Interestingly, the Act allows a judge to order a 
structured damage award instead of a lump sum in specified circumstances 
where this would appear to be necessary to protect the plaintiff55. 
3. Collateral Sources, Resource Allocation, and Benefit Distribution 
Perhaps the most significant and certainly one of the most sensible 
aspects of the no-fault legislation in Ontario and its predecessors is the 
abolition of the common law collateral source rule by which damages are 
quantified without reference to payments received or available from colla-
teral sources. Under the common law rule, the plaintiff is left overcompen-
sated unless the collateral source is willing and able to exercise its rights of 
subrogation, often a wastefully expensive proposition. By one means or 
another, the no-fault plans have made the collateral sources the primary 
source of compensation, and the tortfeasor the secondary source. In addi-
tion, under the new act, the no-fault benefits themselves are designated as 
secondary sources of compensation, with the claimant required to turn first 
to other public and private sources of compensation56. Reducing the amount 
of duplication in coverage, and reducing wasteful loss shifting through 
subrogation, are notable achievements. The legislature ought to consider 
52. Insurance Act, s. 267.8 (9), (10), (12) and (17), also see supra, note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
53. See e.g., Orchover v. Wright, (1996) 28 O.R. (3d) 263. See generally R. BOGOROCH, 
« Cashing Out Accident Benefits Claims under the Statutory Accident Benefits Sched-
ule», (1998) Practical Strategies For Advocates VII—«Four Tort and Accident 
Schemes Ago » (The Advocates Society). 
54. Taken from sample settlement form provided by R. BOGOROCH, loc. cit., note 53. 
55. Insurance Act, s. 267.10. 
56. This is a complete reversal of the Bill 164 scheme which had designated the auto scheme 
as the sole source of compensation. 
B. FELDTHUSEN Compensation in Ontario 487 
passing legislation to abrogate the common law collateral rule across the 
board in tort law. 
However, there is a problem with what has been done with these 
savings. Most have been channelled into the auto sector alone in the form 
of lower premiums. This is because a driver who is injured must turn first to 
another source of compensation, most likely an employment benefit plan. 
This means that the cost of accidents caused by driving are assigned first to 
activities that did not cause the accidents, such as employment57. Driving is 
therefore underpriced. Too many people drive and they experience more 
accidents than would be the case were the true costs of driving reflected in 
the auto premiums. Similarly, too few people are engaged in the employ-
ment sectors because they are paying for accidents they did not cause58. 
This is what one would expect from a scheme designed to control automo-
bile insurance rates, although not what one would expect from a govern-
ment determined to reduce payroll taxes. For the foreseeable future, On-
tario is likely to continue to cross-subsidize drivers in this manner. The only 
exception exists in respect to OHIP benefits. All insurers are required to 
make annual payments to the health plan according to a formula, thus 
allocating at least some of the health care costs to drivers59. OHIP does not 
subrogate60. 
The second aspect of the decision to subsidize automobile rates relates 
to the distributional consequences. Ontario effectively has designated em-
ployment as the sector first responsible for income replacement and extra 
health care benefits. However, employment is not universal and hence can 
not provide universal cover, especially for important health care needs. 
Many people are self-employed, unemployed, under-employed, or em-
ployed in positions that provide few benefits. This trend may be increasing. 
These people are disproportionally the young and the elderly, the poor, 
women, members of minority racial groups, immigrants, and the less well-
educated. Ideally, affordable reasonable and necessary health care needs 
57. One exception is for benefits available under the Worker's Compensation Act. Unless 
the injured worker has elected to bring an action in lieu of claiming worker's compen-
sation benefits, the worker's compensation benefits are the primary source of compen-
sation, not the no-fault benefits. This makes sense from an economic deterrence point 
of view—the employment is the effective cause of the auto accident. See s. 59 of the 
Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. 
58. By this I mean that the accident would have happened whether or not the particular 
employment relation existed ; for example, if it occurred on a weekend drive to the golf 
course. This is not the case when an automobile accident occurs in the course of 
employment, as discussed in note 57. 
59. Insurance Act, s. 14.1. 
60. Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6. 
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should be provided to every citizen by the state. The present auto scheme 
unnecessarily increases the gap between the well-employed « haves » and 
the «have nots»61. The unemployed also subsidize the auto rates paid by 
the employed, because the unemployed will not be eligible for income 
replacement benefits62. 
Conclusion 
Historically, there has been a tendency to compare no-fault benefits to 
tort damage awards, however misguided such a comparison may have 
been63. As a matter of political expedience, for a no-fault scheme to be 
regarded as a viable « alternative » to tort, the benefits cannot be dramati-
cally less, nor quantified on significantly different principles, than would be 
obtained in tort. It is also true that the more generous the no-fault benefits, 
the more likely the scheme will curtail tort. Otherwise the cost of buying 
both generous no-fault and full liability cover would make driving prohibi-
tively expensive. Thus the real world connection between generous no-fault 
benefits and curtailed tort, even though contingent, is a close one. The 
Ontario regime under Bill 164 was as good an example of this as any. 
A no-fault scheme that is not conceptualized or marketed as an alter-
native to tort is less constrained. It can adopt, for example, the relatively 
modest goal of providing mandatory no-fault cover at a basic welfare level. 
Or, it can attempt to provide the best no-fault cover available at pre-esta-
blished rates. Ontario's new scheme reflects both these goals. 
There were two keys to making the scheme viable. The first was to 
throw some of the cost of auto accidents onto other compensation schemes. 
This has resource allocation consequences, in particular because it subsi-
dizes driving at the expense of other activities. This also has undesirable 
distributional consequences to the extent that these alternative sources of 
compensation are less available to the more vulnerable members of society. 
The second was the abolition of the common law collateral source rule. This 
is probably the single most important piece of tort reform ever effected in 
Ontario. It keeps virtually all relatively minor injuries out of the tort system. 
61. This problem is exacerbated when insurers target, for example, employees of large 
employers who offer good benefits, and solicit them with lower rates. On the one hand, 
this seems fair because otherwise those with employment benefits are subsidizing the 
auto premiums of those who do not. On the other hand, this leaves still more to be paid 
by those drivers who do not have the employment benefits. 
62. The elderly retired drivers are permitted to file a declaration that they will not claim the 
earnings benefits and obtain lower rates as a result. 
63. Both because tort has winners and losers and wins are achieved at a cost, and because 
tort arguably exists to serve other goal as much or more as it serves compensation. 
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Leaving tort actions to deal with excess loss pleased the lawyers. It also 
helped the government account politically for the shortfall in the no-fault 
cover. 
The biggest shortcoming in the plan is in the health care area. It seems 
obvious that the insurers and government felt that they could not fund 
reasonable health care for everyone to the catastrophic limits at a satisfac-
tory price. They did establish a solid plan for the less seriously and tempo-
rarily disabled. They did arrange to take care of the most seriously injured 
by defining a class of catastrophic injury eligible for relatively generous 
benefits. However, they also created a compensation gap into which other 
serious and permanently injured victims will fall. It is difficult to believe that 
the government's goals could not be achieved in some other manner more 
compatible with equitable compensation objectives. 
